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On the basic policy issue concerning the period for bringing
the redhibitory action, the protection of the purchaser against
latent defects is counterbalanced not only by the protection of
the vendor against uncertainty in his affairs but also by the
interest of society in the stabilization of transactions. Under both
the French and Spanish laws, there is the basic idea that this
period should be short, and in the present case the difference
between 13 months after the sale and 11 months after the delivery
hardly seems to support an interpretation contra legem.
Another aspect of the prescription against the redhibitory
action is brought out in Mid-City Finance Co. v. Coleman"
which held that the period starts to run from the moment the
vendor abandons his attempts to repair the defects. This matter
was well discussed in the earlier case of Brown v. Dauzat12 and
in previous symposium comments's to the effect that the attempt
to make repairs is an acknowledgment of responsibility and
therefore constitutes an interruption of the prescription.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
Tim LANDOWNER'S RIGHTS IN MINERALS
Unauthorized Removal of Minerals
White v. Phillips Petroleum Co.' is to be noted by a student
in a later issue. However, this writer desires to express the
view that the decision should be read with extreme care and
limited to its specific facts. The case raises the question of the
right of a landowner to recover for unauthorized removal of
minerals. Without delving into details, it is safe to say that the
law recognizes at least two remedies for such conduct: one in
delict under which damages are measured by the value of the
thing taken and the other in quasi-contract for the amount by
which the defendant has been enriched as a result of the taking.2
Early cases also applied the old "theory of the case" doctrine
11. 232 So.2d 918 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
12. 157 So.2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
13. The Work of the Louisiana AppelZate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-
Prescript,on, 25 LA. L. REv. 352, 358-59 (1965).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 232 So.2d 83 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
2. Liles v. Producers Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924); Liles v. Barn-
hart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922); Martin v. Texas Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So.
922 (1921).
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with the result that one framing his petition on a theory of
tort and asking for the appropriate remedy was deemed to have
elected that remedy to the exclusion of all others.3 Perhaps
the most critical significance of application of the concept of
election of remedies lay in the area of prescription. Thus, the
party suing on a delictual theory more than one year from the
date of the damage or its discovery would be defeated by a timely
plea of prescription. 4 Implicit in the jurisprudence is the idea
that if suit had been brought on a theory of quasi-contract,
the prescription of ten years would have been applicable.
Insofar as the White case is concerned, it is important to
emphasize that articles 862 and 2164 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure abolished the "theory of the case" concept. Today, if a
plaintiff alleges the appropriate facts to support recovery under
either of two available remedies, he should not be deemed to
have elected one remedy over the other even though he has
prayed for only one. Additionally, his petition should withstand
a plea of prescription if there are sufficient facts to support
relief on a cause for which prescription has not yet accrued.
The court in White held that under the uncontested construc-
tion of the petition in question the cause of action there alleged
for unauthorized removal of minerals was in tort and that insofar
as the plaintiff was seeking recovery for minerals removed more
than one year after discovery of the removal, the plea of pre-
scription of one year should be sustained. Judge (now Justice)
Tate concurred in the majority opinion "because it is narrowly
restricted to the conclusion that, under the unopposed construc-
tion of the present plaintiffs' petition as seeking delictual relief,
we are not presented with the issues raised by this concurring
opinion" 8-i.e., given a proper factual situation, whether a peti-
tion should be sustained against a plea of prescription if sufficient
facts are alleged to support relief either in delict or quasi-
contract.
In the writer's opinion, the White decision should definitely
be construed in the manner in which Judge Tate's concurring
opinion suggests. Otherwise, there would be a reversion to an
outmoded and expressly discarded procedural concept.
3. See note 2 supra.
4. I&
5. Id.
6. 232 So.2d 83, 92 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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MINmAL SFVITUDES
By Whom a Use May Be Made
One of the hazy questions arising from adoption of the
servitude analogy in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's
Heirs7 has been a determination of what persons may commit
acts which will result in an interruption of prescription by use.
In Nelson v. Young8 the court touched upon this question, par-
tially avoided it, and in the process added confusion to the law.
This case, too, is being noted in a later issue. However, once
again because of the importance of the issue this writer feels
it is desirable to express his own opinion.
Briefly, prescription on the mineral servitude in question
had recommenced after a use by drilling operations in 1952.
In 1957, the landowner granted leases on the property even
though he did not then own the mineral rights in question, and
in 1959, a producing well was completed by the landowner's
lessee. This well produced slightly in excess of one thousand
barrels and was plugged and abandoned in 1964, approximately
two years and five months beyond the prescriptive date of
plaintiffs' mineral servitude. Though it does not appear from
the record, the writer takes scholarly notice of the fact that
there has recently been a substantial revival of interest in
development in the parish in which the subject property is
located. In 1967, three years after the well drilled by the land-
owner's lessee was abandoned, and five years after the prescrip-
tive date of plaintiffs' servitude, the plaintiffs' action was filed,
seeking to be declared owners of the mineral rights in question.
Though the jurisprudence is by no means clear, the nearest
similar case stands for the proposition that the owner of mineral
rights cannot adopt drilling operations by another after the
prescriptive date on which his rights were extinguished for
nonuse.9 Additionally, Civil Code article 618, dealing with the
personal servitude of usufruct and also applicable to other forms
of personal servitude, states that usufruct is extinguished unless
used "by the usufructuary or by any person in his name." Fur-
ther, article 804, applicable to predial servitudes, requires that
to overcome a plea of prescription of nonuse, the owner of the
7. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
8. 255 La. 1043, 234 So.2d 54 (1970).
9. See Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361.
91 So. 765 (1921).
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dominant estate must prove that "he, or some person in his name,
has made use of this servitude as appertaining to his estate
during the time necessary to prevent the establishment of the
prescription."
Despite these decisions and code provisions, the court worked
out a tenuous theory of quasi-contract, reasoning that as a result
of what the court construed as the approving silence of the
mineral servitude owners when the lease was executed by the
landowner and production was established under it, a quasi-
contractual relationship was established, and the act of produc-
ing by the landowner through his lessee became the act of the
servitude owner, thus interrupting prescription. In spinning out
this theory, the court had to deal with the established juris-
prudence that the execution of a lease by a landowner does not
per se interrupt prescription, 0 though his intentional execution
of a joint lease with the servitude owner may effect an "exten-
sion" of prescription under certain circumstances.11 The court
also acknowledged the basic rule that no act of the landowner
should have the effect of interrupting prescription unless he
intends that it do so. 1 2 By an undefined process, the court,
however, reached the conclusion that whereas execution of a
lease by the landowner would have no effect, production under
that lease would cause an interruption of prescription.
The only offered policy basis for the decision was an ex-
pressed fear of rewarding lawless and clandestine acts by the
landowner. This fear is unfounded. The liabilities involved in
intentional execution of leases and production by a landowner
at a time when he does not own the minerals are simply too
great to make it believable that there would be any great
stampede to engage in unlawful development had the court
ruled otherwise. It is here that the court erred. In these situa-
tions there are two sets of legal relationships. One is between
the landowner and the servitude owner insofar as the question
of use is concerned, and the other is between the servitude owner
and the rest of the world, including the landowner, regarding
his ownership of a real right.
10. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956);
LeBleu v. LeBIeu, 206 So.2d 551 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
11. See, e.g., Armour v. Smith, 247 La. 122, 170 So.2d 347 (1964); Achee
v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So.2d 530 (1941); Mulhern v. Hayne, 171 La. 1003,
132 So. 659 (1931).
12. LeBleu v. LeBleu, 206 So.2d 551 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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The first relationship, that between landowner and ser-
vitude owner, requires that a use take place for the servitude
owner or in his name, if resort is had to article 618, or by the
servitude owner or someone in his name "as appertaining to his
estate," if article 804 is used as the analog. But the greater
question is whether permitting adoption of operations by another,
either the landowner or a total stranger, after the prescriptive
date, is beneficial to the system of titles. The writer believes
that it is not. To permit the servitude owner to adopt operations
by another as his own years after the prescriptive date adds
complexity and uncertainty to the title system. Admittedly,
this is not going to be a widespread problem as cases of this
kind are rare, but if another such situation is faced, it would
certainly be difficult for the landowner or his lawyer to deter-
mine a course of action. If anything is said to the servitude owner
or if a lease is granted after the prescriptive date but less than
ten years from the "clandestine" activity, "sleeping dogs" may
well be aroused. Additionally, the legal advisor to the potential
lessee of the landowner is certainly in a difficult position as the
threat of the servitude owner coming in and "adopting" the
prior operations is always present.
Insofar as the court's reliance on the servitude owner's
benign silence as indicating ratification of the lease contract is
concerned, this is questionable at best. There are many explana-
tions and constructions which can be placed on silence in these
situations, and, absent proof that the servitude owner was aware
of the leasing and subsequent operations, the inference drawn
by the court is not warranted. Even a showing of awareness
might not justify the inference.
The second set of legal relationships, that between the ser-
vitude owner as owner of a real right and the rest of the world,
furnishes the sanctions for the lawless and clandestine actions
about which the court expressed concern. If the landowner or
any person other than the owner of the mineral rights appro-
priates all or any part of those rights, there are ample remedies
available. The servitude owner can exercise the real actions,13
use injunctive processes,14 and sue for damages in any of several
possible situations and under any of several available theories.15
These protective devices would apply to physical and legal dis-
13. LA. COD Civ. P. art. 3664.
14. McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 45 So.2d 73 (1949).
15. See the authorities cited in note 2 supra.
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turbances of possession,16 to appropriation of exploration rights
by geophysical exploration,' to the granting of leases, 18 to
unlawful operations,9 and to unlawful production.20 These rights
furnish adequate protection to the mineral servitude owner
against any unlawful acts, whether by the landowner or a total
stranger. And the servitude owner should be permitted to exer-
cise these rights at any time within the appropriate prescriptive
period.21 However, if he has done nothing to adopt another's
actions or to claim his share of production within the prescrip-
tive period, any assertion of rights to damages after the prescrip-
tive date should not result in an interruption of prescription
as he has done nothing to use his rights within the time required.
Reasonable vigilance in the assertion and protection of a mineral
servitude owner's rights is not too much to expect.
In terms of equitable considerations, the other side of the
"lawless exploration and production" argument is that the deci-
sion as rendered permits the mineral servitude owner to sit
back for a period of years after the prescriptive date and walk
in and effectively "take back" what has been lost when a new
development play makes the mineral rights worth fighting about.
The writer is in general accord with the views expressed by
Justice Barham in a cogent and incisive dissent.
Imprescriptible Mineral Servitudes
Franks Petroleum v. Martin22 is an attempt to relitigate the
same basic issues already determined in Franks Petroleum v.
Hobbs23 three years ago. The writer's comments on these issues
16. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 3659 (disturbance in fact and in law defined).
17. Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So.2d 457 (1948) (servi-
tude owner entitled to be paid for the privilege of conducting geophysical
exploration).
18. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3659.
19. Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 212 La. 807, 33 So.2d 527 (1947).
20. Liles v. Producers Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924); Liles v.
Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922); Martin v. Texas Co., 150 La. 556,
90 So. 922 (1921); White v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 232 So.2d 83 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970).
21. The possessory action must be brought within a year of the last
disturbance. LA. CODS Crv. P. art. 3658(4). The petitory action can be brought
at any time unless the land has been acquired by another by acquisitive
prescription. If a servitude owner elects to proceed in tort, he must bring
his action within a year from the date of the offense. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3536.
22. 234 So.2d 268 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
23. 200 So.2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 251 La. 219, 203
So.2d 555 (1967).
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can be found in the 1966-1967 symposium. 24 Briefly, however,
the more recent case involved a tract of land part of which
was expropriated by the United States in 1950. At the time of
the expropriation, the entire tract was subject to an outstanding
mineral servitude. Prior to the expropriation, the servitude
owner had created a royalty interest. In the conveyance to the
government, the landowner purportedly reserved all of the
minerals. Construing the statute in the same manner as it had
in Franks Petroleum v. Hobbs,25 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal held that: (1) as to the portion of the tract expropriated,
prescription on the servitude did not continue to accrue in favor
of the owner of the land at the time of the expropriation; (2)
consequently, that portion of the servitude and the royalty
dependent on it remained alive; (3) prescription continued to
accrue against the servitude insofar as it affected the portion
of the tract not expropriated; and (4) as there had been no use
or other interruption of prescription, the servitude and the
royalty dependent on it had been extinguished as to that portion
of the tract.
MINERAL LEASES
Default Clauses
Bouterie v. Kleinpeter86 is one of those cases in which, con-
trary to the old saw about hard facts making bad law, good
equities may have made some bad law. Fortunately, however,
it is a case which can be limited to a specific contractual pro-
vision. Shortly after the date on which the primary terms of
leases granted by the plaintiffs would otherwise have expired,
they made demand for payment of royalties, stating that "if the
demand . . . made for payment of Lessor's royalty is not com-
plied with we shall institute the necessary legal action to cancel
the said leases." Thirteen days later, royalty payments were
commenced and continued for approximately ten months, at
which time plaintiffs refused further payments and three months
thereafter made demand under LA. R.S. 30:1022 for an instru-
24. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term
--Mineral Rights, 28 LA. L. Rzv. 355, 358 (1968).
25. 200 So.2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
26. 234 So.2d 812 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
27. "If the lessee refuses or fails to comply with the lessor's demand for
such an instrument within ten days, the lessee shall be liable to the lessor
for a reasonable attorney's fee in bringing suit to obtain a decree of can-
cellation and for all damages suffered by the lessor stemming from his
inability to find another lessee because of the noncancellation of the lease."
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ment authorizing cancellation of the leases from the public
records.
Defendant's primary reliance was upon an exception of pre-
maturity based upon the contention that plaintiffs had not com-
plied with the default, or notice, clause in the leases, which
provided:
"11. In the event that Lessor at any time considers that
operations are not being conducted in compliance with this
lease, Lessor shall notify Lessee in writing of the facts
relied upon as constituting a breach hereof, and Lessee, if
legally required to conduct operations in order to maintain
the lease in force, shall have sixty (60) days after receipt
of such notice in which to commence the necessary opera-
tions to comply with the requirements hereof."
Defendants also relied on the prior decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeal in Bollinger v. Republic Petroleum Corp.28
which had held that compliance with the default clause there
involved was a condition precedent to institution of suit to cancel
the lease in question for nonpayment of royalties. Plaintiffs
sought to distinguish the Bollinger case on the ground that the
default clause there involved was applicable if lessee had failed
to "comply with any of its obligations... , either expressed or
implied. . . ." The court, however, resorting to such authorities
as Black's Law Dictionary, Words and Phrases, and Webster's
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, chose to construe "opera-
tions" in the lease form before it as being synonomous with
"obligations" in the Bollinger case.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Blanche clearly had the
better of the technical argument as to the proper construction
of the two clauses. Taking the clause in the instant case as a
whole, it unquestionably refers to "operations" as that term
is traditionally accepted and meant in lease forms. It refers
to "failure to conduct operations," then states that if lessee is
legally required "to conduct operations in order to maintain the
lease in force," lessee shall have sixty days in which to "com-
mence operations." These are all rather clearly understood terms
of art in the drafting and construction of mineral leases, and it
is difficult to discern how the court reached the result achieved.
It would have been easy for the court to have viewed the
28. 194 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 271
notice clause of the lease as being inapplicable to the facts at
hand and still have reached the same end result. Even if the
notice clause were inapplicable, the general law of default would
have required that plaintiffs make a demand for payment29
unless there had been failure to pay for an appreciable length
of time without justification.30 Plaintiffs in fact made such a
demand, which was met by commencement of payments within
a few days thereafter and regular continuance until plaintiffs
refused further payments ten months later.
However, it seems that this approach would have required
that the exception of prematurity be overruled. Despite this
fact, some other exception or procedural device should have been
successful in disposing of the case without trial on the merits.
It seems unlikely that plaintiffs' petition could have withstood
an exception of no cause of action unless there were facts alleged
which do not emerge from the court's opinion. And a motion for
summary judgment seems certain to have succeeded if the
exception could not.
Viewing the practical results of the decision, it appears
likely that the court was impressed with the evidence that plain-
tiffs had accepted royalties for ten months and then started re-
jecting them. Evidence of this was admitted on trial of the ex-
ception of prematurity. Given the proof submitted, it seems
unlikely that plaintiffs could ever have succeeded, and the court
may have felt disposed to render the coup de grace at an early
stage of the proceeding. Nevertheless, the law regarding putting
in default, particularly in cases of nonpayment of royalties, is
in sufficiently critical condition already, and this decision adds
unnecessary confusion to an already muddled area.
Hebert v. Sun Oil Co.31 seems to have brought the nonpay-
ment of royalty cases full circle, and it is now virtually impossi-
ble to predict when a court will award cancellation and when it
will not. The cycle started in Bollinger v. Texas Co.8 2 and Melan-
con v. Texas Co.83 in which the court found coercive conduct
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1933. See Fawvor v. United States Oil of Louisiana,
Inc., 162 So.2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
30. Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962);
Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
31. 223 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
32. 232 La. 637, 95 So.2d 132 (1957).
33. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
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on the part of the lessee, which was withholding royalties to
pressure the lessor into giving consent to the formation of certain
voluntary production units. This was construed as an active
breach of contract and default was not required. From that point,
the concept was extended to include situations in which there
was no such coercive conduct, such as withholding of royalties
because a lessee had not settled a dispute over well costs with
the unit operator34 or failure to pay royalties because of internal
reorganization."5 The formula evolved was that if there was a
failure to pay for an appreciable length of time without justifi-
cation, the breach was active in character and no default was
required. Conceptually, it has always been difficult to perceive
how what is unquestionably a passive breach of contract becomes
active merely by the passage of time. But the development gave
courts the power to assure timely commencement and payment
of royalties in situations in which the remedy provided by the
Civil Code, damages in the form of interest,86 would not be a
sufficient spur to assure diligence on the part of lessees.
A softening of the courts' attitude emerged as justifications
began to be found for failures to pay. These were generally in
the form of title difficulties or administrative delays which were
beyond the control of the lessee and were basically reasonable.8
Further amelioration of the rule occurred when courts began
awarding partial cancellation of leases even though a failure
to pay on certain units or portions of the lease had occurred.8a
Cancellation was refused in the Hebert case on two basic
grounds. First, the failure to pay resulted from clerical error in
revising tract numbers and distributions following a unit re-
vision. This, the court felt, was justifiable reason for the delay,
noting that immediately upon discovery of the error, payment
was made. Second, the amount of the royalties in arrears was
only $13.54 over a five month period, which the court 'did not
consider a "serious basis for cancelling the lease." This was par-
ticularly true in view of the fact that there had been an over-
34. Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
35. Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1935.
37. See Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 166 So.2d 329 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964); Fawvor v. United States Oil of Louisiana, Inc., 162
So.2d 602 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
38. Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So.2d 715 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967); Sellers v. Continental Oil Co., 168 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 273
payment on other royalties exceeding the amount in arrears by
seven cents.
Insofar as the court accepted the clerical error as an excuse,
the decision seems to be in conflict with Pierce v. Atlantic Re-
fining Co.8 9 in which the court rejected internal organizational
problems as justifying a delay of approximately six months. But
the result can be fully justified on the ground that the amount
involved, coupled with the offsetting overpayment, was not a
serious basis for cancellation. Any other result under the cir-
cumstances would have been unjust.
The whole patchwork quilt of jurisprudence concerning non-
payment of royalties needs examination and revision. It seems
highly unlikely that the courts can cut through the smoke and
confusion which has resulted from a well-motivated desire to
put lessors in a better position by giving them some means of
assuring timely commencement and continuance of royalty pay-
ments. However, looking at the state of the jurisprudence, the
game seems hardly to have been worth the candle. A device
intended to prevent coercive conduct, indolence, neglect, or sim-
ple selfishness quickly opened the way for greed to have its day.
When a lessor sues for cancellation over $13.54, one cannot be
surprised that courts would be reluctant to use the protective
device which they have fashioned. The Hebert decision is un-
questionably just, but it underscores even more strongly the
need for a change in the law which must apparently come about
through legislation This writer has previously suggested the
device of subjecting lessees to liability for double or treble the
amount of royalties due. Attorney's fees might also be levied to
permit those with small claims to sue. The lessee, however, should
receive the security of investment which he deserves in these
cases by removing nonpayment of production royalties as a
cause for cancellation of mineral leases.
Surface Damages
Two cases decided during the 1969-1970 term dealt with the
problem of surface damages caused by a lessee's operations. In
Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.40 plaintiff held an unrecorded
agricultural lease, and defendant held a subsequently granted
and recorded mineral lease. Defendant's operations caused dam-
39. 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
40. 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969).
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age to plaintiff's crops for which plaintiff sued. Defendant's
principal defense was that it could not be bound by the unre-
corded agricultural lease. The mineral lease held by defendant
contained an alteration in the standard surface damage clause,
which normally provides that lessee "shall be responsible for all
damages to timber and growing crops of lessor caused by lessee's
operations." The alteration resulted in a clause which provided
that lessee would be responsible "for all damages caused by
lessee's operations." Plaintiff argued that if defendant was not
liable in tort for the crop damage, it was liable under the con-
tract as a stipulation pour autrui. Further considering the argu-
ment, the court reasoned that since the landowner owed his
agricultural lessee the obligation to maintain him in peaceful
possession, there was a possibility of future liability for violation
of that obligation. Thus, the alteration in the damage clause of
the mineral lease protected the landowner from liability. This
was found sufficient to support the holding that the alteration
was intended to confer a benefit on the agricultural lessee.
The decision does justice in the immediate case, but the
particular facts should be carefully viewed. It appears that the
mineral lessee had taken a release from the landowner for "her"
damage upon payment of $125.00. Plaintiff had made repeated
efforts to communicate with persons in authority at the well
site in order that he might obtain reparations for his loss, all to
no avail. The damages to plaintiff's crop amounted to almost
$1300.00, and from the facts recited in the opinion, it appears
that there might have been an attempt to take a quick release
from the landowner under circumstances in which the reason-
able person would be aware that damages to someone's crop
exceeded $125.00. Thus, it was a supportable result for the court
to find that the release to the landowner was for her damages
alone, and the altered surface damage clause benefited plaintiff
by allowing him to recover the remainder of the damages of
which the defendant should reasonably have been aware.
Those on the court who dissented, however, may have been
correct in maintaining that the lessee should not be bound by
the unrecorded agricultural lease in most situations. Given the
basic situation of an altered damage clause, as in this case, and
a prior unrecorded agricultural lease, the mineral lessee should
normally be entitled to take a release from the landowner for
"all" damages caused by his operations. If the landowner made
[Vol. 31
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the alteration for the benefit of the holder of an unrecorded in-
terest who has been damaged, it seems that the landowner
should protect himself by assuring that these damages have been
paid to him in negotiating the release. The landowner could
then discharge his obligation to the agricultural lessee by turning
the money over to him. In this case, however, the court may have
felt that the knowledge which the lessee's employees had of a
complaint of damage to the surface merited the result achieved.
Collins v. Morrow41 also involved a conflict between an
agricultural lessee and a mineral lessee. There was no special
damage clause such as the alteration of the form in the Bouterie
case; therefore, the plaintiff could not recover without proof
that the defendant had used an unreasonable amount of the
surface or had been negligent in using the surface. 42 Clouding
the evidence was a release taken for damage up to August, 1966.
Except for a claim for the value of one steer, the court felt there
was insufficient evidence to prove that damage had occurred
since the date of the compromise and also that the proof of the
amount of damage suffered was vague. The case appears to be
correctly decided and does nothing to alter the existing law as
to the relationship between owners of coexisting rights to use
the surface of the same land.
Royalties-Effect of Price Rollback
Whitehall Oil Co. v. Boagni48 required a determination of
the rights of a lessee who had sold gas which was owned by it
and the lessor under a temporary rate authorization by the Fed-
eral Power Commission. When the permanent rate was fixed at
a lower figure, lessee, as it was required to do, reimbursed the
vendee of the gas for the amount owed because of the rollback.
The reimbursement included both the lessee's and the lessor's
share of the gas. Lessee then sued lessor for the amount which
had been reimbursed to the vendee on the lessor's share of the
gas. The court upheld the right of the lessee to recover from
the lessor the amount repaid to the vendee as a result of the
rollback. The court relied on the general principle of unjust
enrichment and on express provisions of the lease under which:
41. 234 So.2d 234 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
42. See, e.g., Wemnple v. Pasadena Petroleum Co., 147 La. 532, 85 So.
230 (1920); Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1958); Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953). See
Note, 26 TUL. L. Rzv. 522 (1952).
43. 255 La. 67, 229 So.2d 702 (1969).
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(1) sales of lessor's gas by lessee had to be at the same price
and on the same terms as those received by lessee for its own
gas and (2) the lease was subjected to state and federal regula-
tory orders.
The only curious note in the opinion is found in the fact
that the court assumes, arguendo, that Civil Code articles 2301-14
concerning payment of a thing not due are inapplicable to the
instant case and yet ultimately supports its conclusion on the
basis of the principle of unjust enrichment. The articles on pay-
ment of a thing not due constitute one specification of the under-
lying principle of unjust enrichment. Although the court did
not hold but only assumed that the articles on payment of a
thing not due were not applicable, the assumption could have
been a holding, for at the time the lessee paid the royalties at
the higher temporary rate, the amounts paid were unquestion-
ably due. However, looking beneath these articles and applying
the basic principle of unjust enrichment is laudable judicial
technique.
The defenses raised were that voluntary payments of dis-
puted sums cannot be recovered, even though later found not to
have been due, and equitable estoppel. The first defense was
properly rejected on the ground that the sums paid were not
disputed but were clearly due at the time paid. The second was
rejected on the ground that there was no proof of detrimental
reliance.
The opinion conveys the feeling that the result would be
achieved except in the presence of unusual circumstances. There
is substantial justice in requiring the lessor to bear his propor-
tionate share of the price rollback. However, the case suggests
that as a matter of policy, when gas is sold under conditions
which make the lessor liable to repayment of a portion of royal-
ties received, the lessee should inform the lessor of this contin-
gency. Failure to do so could impose hardship on some individual
lessors, and the situation presents the possibility that given
proper circumstances a lessee might be considered to have
breached his obligation to act as a prudent administrator.44 The
lease provision requiring that sales of lessor's gas be at the same
price and on the same terms as sales of lessee's gas is a protec-
tive device for the lessor. It makes express what is implied by
44. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2710.
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the lessee's duty to deal fairly with the lessor's interest.4 5 This
express provision is not present in many common lease forms.
Therefore, in many instances the lessee would not be able to
rely on supporting lease terms. The argument that the lessor
would be unjustly enriched if not compelled to bear his share of
the rollback might be offset and overcome by a contention that
the lessee's duty to act as a prudent administrator and to deal
fairly with the interest of the lessor requires that the lessor be
informed of the contingency on which the gas was sold so that
he might protect himself against hardship by setting up a reserve
against the potential liability. This possible argument was not
mentioned in the Boagni opinion, but it might be persuasively
urged in future litigation.
Mandamus to Compel Payment of Royalties
In Todd v. Tarpon Oil Co.46 plaintiff sought a writ of man-
damus compelling defendant operator to pay him sums repre-
senting the value of production attributable to a small overriding
royalty and a fraction of the working interest owned by plaintiff.
Defendant filed exceptions of no cause or right of action and
unauthorized use of summary process. Defendant's principal
objection was that under LA. R.S. 30:105-07, which authorize the
issuance of writs of mandamus to compel payment of royalties
or other sums due to a party holding an interest under a mineral
lease, there must be a "sum certain."47 It was contended that
there was no sum certain because plaintiff owed defendant for
his share of drilling and operating costs. The court correctly held
that whether there was a sum certain was a question to be deter-
mined on the merits of whether the writ should issue and denied
defendant's exceptions.
DRILLING CONTRACTS
Duncan v. Gill5 was a dispute between a drilling contractor
and co-owners of a lease. A written contract for the drilling of
one well was entered into by plaintiff contractor and defendant
lessee. After drilling of the well, the contractor performed fur-
45. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
46. 224 So.2d 525 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
47. State ex rel. Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 242
La. 315, 136 So.2d 55 (1961); State ex rel. Brown v. United Gas Public Ser-
vice Co., 197 La. 616, 2 So.2d 41 (1941); State ex rel. Boykin v. Hope Produc-
ing Co., 167 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
48. 227 So.2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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ther services by completing that well, reworking an old well as
a salt water disposal well, and drilling a second well. Defendants
denied any liability for services performed beyond the drilling of
the initial well. Recovery was allowed on a quantum meruit
basis for the services based on findings that the lessee was aware
of and in effect had authorized the additional work. The facts
are complicated, but insofar as the case allows recovery for the
services rendered there can be no doubt as to the correctness of
the result.
A second issue in the case was whether co-owners of the lease
were to be held liable as ordinary partners, and therefore on a
virile share basis, or in proportion to their ownership of the lease.
The court relied on established jurisprudence holding that a joint
venture operation in the drilling of a well is to be governed by
the rules applicable to ordinary partnerships49 and held the co-
owners liable on a virile share basis.50 The case should be viewed
as a warning to the small investor who buys a fractional working
interest in a promoted well. Under this decision and those on
which the court relied, such an investor might buy, say, a 1/64th
interest and be held liable to third parties far in excess of his
ownership of the lease. Investments of this kind are often moti-
vated by the dual tax attraction of being able to write off intan-
gible drilling costs and to take the depletion allowance in the
event of production. Generally, the investor has no real inten-
tion of exercising management authority or participating in
decision making in the way in which his status as a co-owner of
the lease would technically permit him to do. He has little or no
contact with the promoter and does not participate in the letting
of contracts or supervision of operations. To subject him to lia-
bility beyond the proportion of his ownership in such instances
seems harsh.
The leading case cited by the court, Young v. Reed,51 refused
to limit liability to the proportionate ownership fractions of the
defendants because it was clear that they had played an active
role in organizing and managing the undertaking there involved.
Thus, refusing to limit liability to ownership fractions in that
case made parties who were active in the venture responsible as
49. Posey v. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175 (1937); Suckle v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 163 So.2d 564 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Young v.
Reed, 192 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
50. LA. CIv. CoDE art. 2873.
51. 192 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
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they should have been to persons with whom the venturers con-
tracted. In the Duncan case, however, the principle of the Young
decision is turned around and applied so as to make essentially
passive parties liable beyond the measure of their ownership
interests. One wonders if some functional examination of the
roles being played by the parties in these instances might not
permit the court to allocate responsibility to third parties on the
basis of ownership in some cases and partnership in others,
depending on the real structure of the business arrangement
involved. If the present rule is adhered to, however, the small
investor and his attorney would be well-advised to insert pro-
tective wording in the assignments of working interest which
would require the promoter to indemnify the investor for any
liability to third parties beyond the fraction of his ownership.
This would permit third parties to look to co-owners classified as
ordinary partners on a virile share basis and simultaneously af-
ford a measure of protection to the investor. Of course, if the pro-
moter is not responsible or is impecunious, the measure of pro-
tection might in fact be small, but this course is certainly prefer-
able to leaving the agreement silent and leaving the small inves-
tor entirely without recourse. Even this solution is not thor-
oughly satisfactory as these investments are often made and the
assignments given without benefit of legal advice to the investor.
It is this reality which suggests that the application of the joint
venture principle embodied in Young v. Reed52 might well be
re-examined and applied on the basis of the real structure of
individual business arrangements.
Another drilling contract case, J. C. Trahan Drilling Con-
tractor, Inc. v. Cockrell,"3 involved a claim by the drilling con-
tractor for expenses incurred in fishing operations necessitated
by the sticking of the drill pipe. A standard drilling contract
form was used. Under the form, the owner had responsibility
for the mud program and the contractor was charged with
giving written recommendations for changes in the mud program
designed by the owner. The contract expressly contemplated
that oil might be added to the mud to increase the rate of
penetration. An additive known as Protectomagic, consisting
of eighty per cent diesel oil and twenty per cent blown asphalt,
was added at the owner's direction and with the knowledge
of the contractor. Plaintiff contractor claimed that the additive
52. Id.
53. 225 So.2d 599 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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caused the sticking, asserting that chemical reaction of the
asphalt with the mud particles caused flocculation of the mud
which prevented effective sealing of the walls of the hole. This
in turn, it was asserted, resulted in a pressure differential
which caused the drill pipe to adhere to the wall of the hole and
become stuck. Plaintiff contended that use of Protectomagic
was not a use of "oil" as contemplated by the contract, thus
supporting its right to recovery under the contract. The court
held that the additive could fairly be regarded as "oil" under
the contract and that plaintiff's knowledge of the use of the
additive amounted to a consent to its utilization.
Plaintiff alternatively claimed in tort, alleging and seeking
to prove that defendant was negligent in adding the Protecto-
magic. The court concluded that plaintiff had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that addition of the Protecto-
magic or negligence in mixing it with the mud caused the pipe
to stick. To the contrary, the court found that defendant's
hypothesis that the sticking was caused by what is known as
"key-seating," the hanging of pipe collars at a point or points
where the hole has deviated significantly from the vertical,
was the more likely explanation for the sticking. The claim
in tort was thus denied. In reaching this result, the court refused
to apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur on the ground that the
defendant owner did not have exclusive control of the mud
program, a requirement for application of the doctrine.
OPERATING AGREEMENTS
The decision of the court of appeal in Crow Drilling &
Producing Co. v. Hunt" was discussed in the 1968-1969 sym-
posium. The supreme court granted writs55 and rendered an
opinion affirming the judgment of the court of appeal during
the 1969-1970 term." The reasons given are very much the
same as those in the decision by the court of appeal, and there
is no need for detailed discussion here. Briefly, the dispute
involved construction of an operating agreement and two letter
agreements looking toward the drilling of two wells and execu-
tion of the operating agreement which included both wells. At
the center of the controversy was the effect of failure of title.
Both courts held that under the clear terms of the letter agree-
54. 211 So.2d 128 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
55. 252 La. 867, 214 So.2d 544 (1968).
56. 254 La. 662, 226 So.2d 487 (1969).
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ments, partial failure of title was not to decrease the sharing
arrangement agreed upon. As previously noted, the decision
may cause some concern, but careful draftsmanship may avoid
any consequences of this decision considered undesirable.
Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.' required
interpretation of an operating agreement and a contemporaneous
supplementary agreement by which the parties sought to pro-
vide for a means of adjusting costs if the Commissioner of
Conservation formed units which altered the percentage of
participation in the well drilled under the agreement. Excep-
tions of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, improper
venue, and prematurity were filed. The court of appeal denied
the exceptions of want of jurisdiction and improper venue but
sustained the exception of prematurity. As the case is pending
on writs at this time, discussion will be pretermitted until the
case is finally decided.
CONSERVATION
In Miller v. Menefee58 plaintiff sought to have an order
of the Commissioner of Conservation struck down as illegal.
The Commissioner had established a drilling unit including
approximately 30 acres of plaintiff's land, which was under lease
to Superior Oil Company. Plaintiff contended that the order
was illegal and that the unit was established so as to include
part of his land as a means of maintaining Superior's lease by
the unit operations. As far as the writer can determine, a legal
argument was made to the effect that as the unit was unexplored
at the time it was established, Statewide Order No. 29-E, which
establishes spacing regulations applicable in the absence of
special orders, governed; as the purpose of conservation was
being served by the statewide order, it was argued, there was
no conservation purpose to be served by the unitization order.
The court rejected this argument. There was apparently no
serious attack on the technical basis for the order as opinions
of the witnesses for the Commissioner that there was reasonable
ground for the issuance of the order were uncontradicted.
The court's holding is proper. Any other result would wreak
havoc with the normal operation of the regulatory scheme.
57. 226 So.2d 565 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 255 L. 233, 230
So.2d 89 (1970).
58. 228 So.2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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The Commissioner customarily operates by establishing a series
of units for a pool, some of which are for wells already drilled
and others of which regulate undrilled areas. To hold that the
Commissioner cannot form units for undrilled areas would fly
in the face of the clear provisions of the conservation act per-
mitting him to establish "drilling units." 9 The establishment
of units in advance of drilling achieves the orderly and coopera-
tive development of pools. To prevent the Commissioner from
establishing units on unexplored areas just because he promul-
gated a statewide spacing order applicable when no units are
in existence would obstruct accomplishment of the statutory
purpose.
CORRMLATIVE RIGHTS
Though it is outside the field of mineral rights insofar as
the factual situation involved is concerned, the decision of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in Reymond v. State, Department
of Highways60 is something on which this writer feels con-
strained to comment because of its potential serious and adverse
impact on mineral law. Until the Reymond decision, it had been
thought by many, including the writer, that articles 667-73
of the Civil Code contained specifications of a widely recognized
general principle, the obligation of good neighborhood arising
from concurrent use of an important resource, land, under
circumstances which require a measure of consideration by
land users each for the rights of others. The Reymond decision,
resorting to the works of Domat, narrowly limits the applicability
of article 667 to "works," meaning structures erected on the
land. This writer respectfully disagrees with the limitation
imposed by the Reymond decision. It is, as noted by Justice
Sanders' dissenting opinion, contrary to established jurispru-
dence.61 Further, it fails to take note of the existence of an
underlying principle in the articles of the Civil Code which
can and should be extracted and applied to achieve justice in
settling disputes between users of land and the resources which
it contains.
This symposium will contain divergent views on the cor-
rectness of the Reymond decision, but this writer is of the
59. LA. R.S. 30:9B (1950).
60. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970).
61. See the authorities cited by Justice Sanders. Id. at 466-67, 231 So.2d
at 390. These authorities range from pile driving and seismic exploration
to the use of insecticides.
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opinion that it is an improvident one which uses the strict,
exegetic style of construction now generally disregarded by
modern doctrinal writers on the subject of code interpretation.
Taking a leaf from the book of judicial technique, the writer
concurs generally in the remarks of Professor Yiannopoulos
elsewhere in this symposium. However, some note of the impact
of the decision on the field of mineral law is proper.
Anglo-American jurisdictions 'recognize what has become
known as the doctrine of correlative rights which governs the
relationship between parties having interests in a common
source of supply of minerals. The following passage from an
article by Professor Eugene Kuntz of the University of Okla-
homa presents a good functional analysis of the basis for the
doctrine of correlative rights:
"Because of the reciprocal effect which the conduct of the
parties who own interests in a common source of supply
of oil or gas will have on one another, they may be described
as operating in a special community, and the conduct which
will or will not be tolerated in connection with such opera-
tions will be determined by the social acceptability of such
conduct within such special community. In determining
whether a particular form of conduct is or is not socially
acceptable, we may not only look to generally accepted
standards, but we must look to the utility of such conduct
in the light of the special consequences which may be
expected to follow for the other parties in the same special
community. The term 'correlative rights' is simply a term
to describe such reciprocal rights and duties of the owners
in a common source of supply. 0 2
In Anglo-American jurisdictions relief has been granted for
waste of the common resource resulting from various causes."
Relief has also been granted where an attempt was made to
disguise waste beneath the cover of a sham, low magnitude
economic utilization of the resources. 64 Recovery has been
allowed in the case of negligent waste of the common resource,
as, for example by a blowout which due care could have
62. Kuntz, Correlative Rights of Parties Owning Interests in a Common
Source of Supply of Oil or Gas, 17th INST. ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXA-
TiON, 217, 224-25 (1966).
63. Id.
64. Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368
(1903).
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prevented. 5 There does not, however, seem to be any instance
to date in which courts have been willing to impose liability
for waste of the common source of supply without either intent
or negligence. This reflects a determination that the public
interest in utilization of the resources is such that the ordinary
risks of waste occasioned by occurrences which are not the
result of intentional or negligent conduct should not be shifted
from one party engaged in extraction to others engaged in the
same utilitarian endeavor. The fact that ordinary risks have not
been shifted among those engaged in extraction does not, how-
ever, mean that relief cannot be granted if, once an event has
taken place, an operator does not take reasonable steps to
remedy a situation resulting in waste. If, for example, a pro-
ducing formation is menaced by a blowout resulting from an
unavoidable accident causing waste of the common resource,
the operator suffering the accident cannot fail to take all neces-
sary and reasonable measures to minimize the damage to other
interests in the common source of supply."
Other cases in Anglo-American jurisdictions have dealt with
spoilage of the common reservoir. For example, excessive rates
of withdrawal causing intrusion of water in the producing
formation; 7 failure to plug an abandoned well, permitting intru-
sion of water;6 and negligence in "shooting" a well.69 All these
have been situations warranting relief. Modern techniques of
pressure maintenance and secondary recovery are beginning
to cause problems in other jurisdictions. In one instance, water
flood operations deprived an owner of his right to primary
production, and relief was granted.70
This brief review of cases involving correlative rights in
other jurisdictions reveals that those with interests in a com-
mon source of supply of oil and gas are generally regarded as
constituting a special community in which each party using
the common resource must behave as a good neighbor to the
other members of the special community. The interest of each
member of the community in the common resource extends
65. Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
66. Larkins-Warr Trust Co. v. Watchorn Petroleum Co., 198 Okla. 12, 174
P.2d 589 (1946).
67. Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas and Oil Co.,
155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900).
68. Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W. Va. 707, 79 S.E. 647 (1913).
69. Commanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas & Pac. Coal Co., 298 S.W. 554
(Tex. Comm. 1927).
70. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963).
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beyond the limits of the geographical boundaries of the property
in which he has an interest. It is precisely this sort of considera-
tion which is involved in the basic principle underlying article
667 of the Civil Code. Those using the surface of land to erect
structures or make any other utilization of their property con-
stitute a special neighborhood or community. There are certain
ordinary risks or inconveniences which the relationship of neigh-
borhood entails and which must be endured. These ordinary
risks are not transferred from one member of the community
to another in the absence of negligence. There are other risks
of land use, however, which are so severe that responsibility
for damage can be fixed upon the user regardless of the manner
of his performance of the particular use. Still other uses are so
out of character with the general community or so dangerous
that they can be completely prohibited. Control of this last
type of use is now largely vested in zoning authorities which
make determinations as to what uses can be permitted in partic-
ular neighborhoods considering the present use of the neighbor-
hood, changes in its character, and all other factors relevant
to the required adjudication. However, there are even now
instances in which courts, through the issuance of injunctions,
can prohibit new or unreasonably dangerous utilizations of land.
The relationship of neighborhood is as existent among
users of the subsurface who are engaged in extracting oil, gas,
or other minerals, as between users of the surface. The ordinary
inconveniences or risks of this particular kind of neighborhood
are not to be shifted from the shoulder of one producer to
another without negligence. Thus, the risk of a blowout in oil
and gas operations is, as among those in the business of extract-
ing these minerals, an ordinary risk of operation, and it is not
transferred from one operator or mineral owner to another in
the absence of a showing of negligence. However, it is conceiv-
able that certain ultrahazardous uses of a reservoir might be
the occasion for fixing responsibility without regard to the
degree of care exercised. Thus, utilization of an experimental
technique such as a so-called "fire-flood" as a secondary recovery
method might be a situation in which the party engaging in the
use of controlled combustion in the reservoir to raise the tem-
perature and thus decrease the viscosity of the reservoir sub-
stances would warrant the imposition of responsibility to others
with interests in the pool, or even in other pools, if the process
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got out of control and damage resulted, regardless of the care
exercised by the operator.
The Louisiana Conservation Act is based upon the assump-
tion that those whose property and mineral interests overlie
a common source of supply of oil or gas have rights in the
common reservoir even though their surface property lines
encompass only a small portion of the area underlain by it.
Analytically, these shared rights fall into two basic categories:
(1) the right to an opportunity to produce a just and equitable
share of the common resource and (2) the right to utilize the
natural drive or energy of the reservoir which aids in producing
the reservoir substances. 1 The best device available in the
Louisiana Civil Code for giving expression to these rights in
private disputes is article 667.
The principle of good neighborhood embodied in article 667
is pervasive. The relationship of neighborhood can be established
in many instances. It need not, and should not, be limited to
the use of the surface of land, or to a particular form of utiliza-
tion. Nor should it be limited strictly to "proprietors," which
a literal interpretation of article 667 might support. The appli-
cability of the principle of article 667 to mineral matters in Lou-
isiana is sustained in the jurisprudence. For example, in Higgins
Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co.72 a landowner left a well
uncapped, decreasing the pumping efficiency of his neighbor's
well. An injunction was granted against such conduct in specific
reliance upon article 667.
It is noteworthy that one operating for oil and gas can be
simultaneously a member of two or more communities or neigh-
borhoods, and the same act may be an ordinary risk as to one
and an ultra-hazardous or extraordinary risk as to another. For
example, if the operator is drilling in a residential area and
his well blows out, his responsibility may be fixed under article
667 for damage to neighboring homeowners without regard to
the care he has exercised. However, his responsibility to the
same parties for damage to a productive reservoir would entail
consideration of whether he has been careful. The risk of blow-
out as among the neighborhood or community interested in the
reservoir is an ordinary risk of oil and gas operation. It is one
71. See LA. R.S. 30:9D (1950) and LA. R.S. 30:11B (1950).
72. 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919). See also Adams v. Grlgsby, 152 So.2d
619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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of the "inconveniences" involved in the relationship of neigh-
borhood among those utilizing the oil and gas beneath the land.
It is significant that even without special articles corre-
sponding to those in the Louisiana Civil Code, the French rec-
ognize the relationship of neighborhood.3 It would be a pity if
Louisiana, by a narrow, restrictive interpretation of article 667
and its companion provisions took from its law a flexible, useful
tool by refusing to recognize the underlying general principle.
Certainly, if the Reymond decision stands, the court must be
aware and bear carefully in mind that it has impact on a large
number of areas of law. The danger of upsetting the jurispru-
dence cited by Justice Sanders is that it leaves the way open
for enterprising advocates to argue that in cases similar to those
formerly treated by use of article 667 the Reymond case means
that defendants can no longer be made responsible for their
actions. If the court is to embark on a course of distinguishing
ordinary risks of land use from ultra-hazardous ones and fixing
responsibility accordingly without use of article 667, it should
do so with full awareness and extreme care.
CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1933 in Fudickar v.
Inabnet' held that when there are outstanding claims against a
dissolved corporation, which claims were disregarded by the
liquidator, persons possessing the claims have a right of action
against former stockholders who have become distributees of
the assets. Following the Fudickar case, in which the claim had
arisen from contract, the court in Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works2
applied the same reasoning to a tort claim. Both of these de-
cisions recognized the absence of specific authority in the Busi-
ness Corporation Act8 for such a procedure and based the rulings
on Louisiana Civil Code article 21. In Collins v. Richland Avia-
tion Service, Inc.4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal referred
to the revision in 1968 of our corporation statutes but followed
73. See Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louiana: The Obligations of Neighbor-
hood, 40 TuL. L. REv. 701 (1966).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 176 La. 777, 146 So. 745 (1933).
2. 182 So. 365 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Note, 13 TUL. L. REv. 308 (1939).
3. La. Acts 1928, No. 250.
4. 225 So.2d 241 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
